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Nigeria is ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Since it regained 
democratic status in 1999, successive governments have made several attempts to 
ameliorate corruption. One such attempt is the establishment of the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), in 2000.  
This study examined the manner in which the ICPC conceptualises corruption, including 
its forms and consequences. It also examined what measures it proposes to combat 
corruption. The ICPC’s approach to corruption is evaluated in relation to the way 
corruption is understood in scholarly literature, especially within the education sector. 
The rationale for the study is that the potential effectiveness of anti-corruption activities 
is based, in part, on the appropriacy of the understanding of corruption that informs such 
activities. 
To carry out this study, the annual reports of the ICPC for the period from 2009 to 2013 
were analysed. These documents describe all the activities of the Commission for these 
years. A rigorous textual analysis was conducted, focusing on descriptions of activities of 
the Commission that applied across sectors, as well as descriptions of activities related to 
education, specifically.  The strongest conclusion reached is that the approach of the ICPC 
could potentially be strengthened considerably if it were to be informed by engagement 
with scholarship relating to corruption. However, this engagement is itself subject to 
political will. Where there is no such engagement, or where political will is not strong, it 
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Corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the African continent. In a study conducted 
by Transparency International in 2016, it was revealed that out of 176 countries studied, 
the least corrupt African country is Botswana (and it was ranked 35th in the world, the 
same as Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and The Grenadines) while the highest ranked 
corrupt nation in sub-Saharan Africa is Somalia (as it is the least ranked nation at the 
176th position) (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2016). This 
report also showed that most of the nations in sub-Saharan Africa fall within the bottom 
half of the index, thus asserting sub-Saharan Africa as the most corrupt region, 
alongside Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with its average integrity index score of 31 
(Botswana with 60 and Somalia with 10). Nigeria was ranked at the 136th position 
alongside Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea scoring 
an integrity index score of 28. 
It is worrisome to see that corruption is entrenched on this continent as it contributes 
to abject poverty on a continent, which is potentially the richest, in both human and 
natural resources. The World Bank has blamed corruption for the failure of certain 
developing African countries to develop to its full potentials, including Nigeria. This is 
because recent empirical research has confirmed that there is a relationship between 
higher corruption and lower investment and growth (Treisman, 2000). The failure of its 
leaders to maximally harness these resources to its greatest advantage makes the impact 
of corruption more evident on the continent. Most of these resources are used for 
private interests. For example, even though Nigeria has the largest economy on the 
African continent, the majority of its 170 million population still live on less than one 
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US dollar per day (the standard economic measure of absolute poverty) (Enakhimion, 
2011). 
The poverty in Nigeria is partly linked to corruption. Shehu (2005) asserts that 
prolonged military intervention in this governance of this country, poor institutional 
structures, including the criminal justice system and its bureaucracy, as well as systemic 
corruption, are the key issues hindering this country from becoming a developed nation.  
Although corruption has a huge historical presence in Nigeria, successive governments 
have in one way or the other tried to erect measures to curb it because it is perceived 
that corruption presents a major setback to the development of the country. For 
example, since 1999, there has been the establishments of anti-corruption agencies such 
as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (hereafter the EFCC), the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (hereafter the 
ICPC), electoral tribunals and many more. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Education has been identified as one of the defining factors that can determine the 
developmental path of any nation. According to Kingdom and Maekae (2013), education 
is expected to play the following roles in Nigeria, among others: supply the needed 
manpower for national development, promote social and group relationships, promote 
the culture of productivity and develop in individuals those values which make for good 
citizenship. As a result, nations allocate huge chunks of their budgets towards the 
development of education. If education, as the bedrock for national development 
(Ilechukwu, 2014), is tainted with corruption, as the case may be in most developing 
countries (Kaffenberger, 2012; Awojobi, 2014), the consequences are quite grievous. In 
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fact, even the chairman of the ICPC stated that “…locally, public perception as a 
corruption-ridden country persists…” in Nigeria (ICPC, 2009: 5).  
According to Nwankwo and Nweke (2016), corruption is a general disease in Nigeria’s 
education system (which includes school proprietors, policymakers, examination 
councils, teachers, supervisors and invigilators) and leads to the abuse of teaching as a 
profession like other professional bodies in Nigeria. In fact, Nwaokugha and Ezeugwu 
(2017) summed it up by stating that corruption in the Nigeria’s education system: 
“has multiple capabilities for undermining the national development of Nigeria. 
Corruption in the education industry terribly creates infrastructural deficits that result in 
poor instructional delivery and making many people not to have access to education which 
in addition to being a fundamental human right is a spring board for their empowerment 
and emancipation infrastructural deficits and inability of a people to have access to 
education systematically renders useless the ability of the people to engineer national 
development as generations of citizens are left frustrated, disgruntled and disenchanted in 
addition to manifesting terrible immorality in the forms of militancy and insurgency.” 
Given the major role that education plays in national development, as stated above by 
Kingdom and Makae (2013) as well as Ilechukwu (2014), it is important to safeguard it 
from corruption by all means, including research. Although numerous studies have 
been conducted on the role played by anti-corruption agencies within the governmental 
or political sphere [Ogbu (2008), Enweremadu (2010), Waziri (2011), Oladoyin (2012), 
Ikpeze (2013)], little to none was thus far directed at the role that they play within the 
education sector. This dissertation endeavours to help fill this gap by examining how 
Nigeria’s foremost anti-corruption agency, the ICPC has approached the task of fighting 
corruption. The study has adopted the ICPC for investigation on the basis that the 
Commission is the first anti-corruption agency established in this country since the 
commencement of the 4th republic in 1999. Secondly, of the two major anti-corruption 
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agencies, ICPC and EFCC, the former covers a wider scope (including education) while 
the latter is only tasked with economic and financial crimes (…money-laundering). 
PURPOSES OF THE STUDY 
Because this study is based on the assumption of this study that an anti-corruption 
agency cannot ameliorate corruption except the agency possesses a good understanding 
of the scope of corruption as affirmed by the World Bank (1997), Centre of Democracy 
and Governance (1999), ICPC (2009) as well as Othman, Shafie and Hamid (2014), the 
purposes of the study are given: 
a. To examine the ICPC’s conceptualisation of corruption, including its forms and 
consequences in order to understand corruption as a phenomenon in all its facets 
and to identify its consequences in, specifically the Nigerian educational system. 
b. To explore the measures proposed by the ICPC reports, as a case study, for 
curbing corruption in the education sector of Nigeria. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
a. How does the ICPC conceptualise corruption including its correlates, forms and 
consequences? 
b. Based on the above, how does the ICPC conceptualise corruption in the Nigerian 
education system, specifically? 
c. How does the conceptualisation of corruption, including its correlates, forms, 
consequences and ways of reducing it compare to the measures considered to be 
effective in scholarly literature? 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this study is the Nigeria education system, which includes all the primary, 
secondary and tertiary schools in all of the thirty-six states of the country. 
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CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA’S EDUCATION SYSTEM 
As anti-corruption fighters continue to engage in a vigorous fight against the monster 
called corruption, the anti-corruption tentacles have fallen on public officials (both 
former and serving). The latter include elected officials, the political class, civil servants, 
the police and military, contractors, and business associates of public officials alongside 
their family members (Oregon Government Standards and Practices Commission, 
2003). Although the education sector forms part of the public domain, its administrators 
and stakeholders have received little or no attention and their conduct has, thus, not 
been put under serious scrutiny. This is troublesome as the prevalence of corruption in 
the education sector may constitute a serious tragedy as it has the potential of 
destroying the quality of any nation’s entire education system (Narayan & Narayan, 
2014). In Nigeria, the situation is not different. Manipulations, favouritism and bribery 
have replaced merit and personal effort as students no longer see the need to take their 
studies seriously (Otomiewo, 2011). This perception has been engrafted into the 
worldview of the Nigerian society. The society even condones helping students to 
subvert the ethics, guiding education, just to acquire an academic qualification.  
Several scholars have outlined various undesirable activities that are present in the 
nation’s education system. Odia and Omofonmwan (2007), for instance, identified 
examination malpractice as one of the corrupt activities undermining the provision of 
quality education in Nigeria. Although they attribute this to a lack of self-confidence on 
the part of the students, they also noted that the students resort to it because of the 
rising costs of education (school fees, enrolment fees, cost of books and other materials) 
making it difficult for them to accept failure as an option. Parents, alongside, go to any 
length possible — even if it means breaking the rules — to ensure that their children 
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are not held back in their pursuit of academic qualification. In this regard, Du Plessis 
(2014) reports that in 2006, the chief executive of the National Examinations, in fact, 
authorised the council’s officers to accept bribes from desperate students and parents. 
Tambawal (2013) further itemises other forms of examination malpractice including 
leakage of examination questions before the day of writing, impersonation, external 
assistance, smuggling of foreign materials into the examination centres and copying or 
reproduction of another’s work without permission (plagiarism). Other forms include 
the intimidation of examination officials, collusion (the unauthorised passing of 
information between students), improper or deliberate assignment of candidates to 
centres that are under the supervision of corrupt officials, the establishment of ghost 
centres, the deliberate alteration of marks designed to increase or decrease a student’s 
original mark and the fraudulent certification of individuals by schools. There were even 
reported cases of teachers encouraging students to contribute money so that they would 
be assisted during examinations.  
While the teachers bank on the poor preparation of the students for examinations, the 
students bank on poor invigilation by examination officials to carry out examination 
malpractice. Interviews with 50 school heads in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria, for 
example, revealed that more than 50% of secondary school students, desperate to pass, 
choose to enrol and write their final year examination in interior private schools where 
exam success is guaranteed (Odia & Omofonmwan, 2007). Anzene (2014) adds that the 
administration of examinations by the West African Examination Council (WAEC), the 
National Examination Council (NECO) and the Joint Admission and Matriculation 
Board (JAMB) has been affected by numerous complaints of examination malpractices 
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as well as various organisational, administrative and bureaucratic irregularities. Even 
the former Minister of Education, Prof. Ruqqayatu Ahmed Rufa’I, at a National 
Examination Summit held in Abuja on the 24th of May 2010, stated that education 
malpractice during the WAEC Senior School Certificate Examination has been 
increasing between the years 2005 and 2009. She referred to the fact that the NECO 
examinations over 263,000 cases of examination malpractice during the 
November/December examination period and over 1,000,000 cases during the 2009 
June/July schools’ examinations (Aneze, 2014). 
Furthermore, one of the reasons why societal respect for the teaching profession has 
declined, as a result of the effects of corruption, is that the relevant authorities that are 
supposed to maintain the ethics of the profession have failed to do so. The government 
alongside its agencies (such as the Ministry of Education, National Commission for 
Colleges of Education (NCCE), National Universities Commission (NUC), Joint 
Admission Matriculation Board (JAMB), the National Board for Technical education 
(NBTE) and many more, are responsible for running the country’s education sector. 
Ogwuazor and Nwaham (2010) opine that government is the biggest culprit responsible 
for whatever ills that have befallen the country’s education system. Adebisi, Adebisi and 
Arogundade (2012) note that the government oversees the granting of approval to 
private and public tertiary institutions with little or no facilities, non-provision of 
adequate teaching and learning facilities, political pressure on institutional 
administrators to admit a greater number of students than the carrying capacities of 
their courses. Mismanagement of funds on the part of government officials is also 
noticeable. An example was cited by both Ogbu (2008) and du Plessis (2014) of a former 
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Minister of Education, Prof. Fabian Osuji, in 2005, who allegedly paid US$400,000.00 in 
bribe to six members of the National Assembly to vote for a rigged education budget. 
Ogbu (2008) also refers to the fact that the then acting Accountant-General of the 
Federation, Mr. Vincent Azie, in a report to the National Assembly, stated that the sum 
of N1,265,272,388.99 (approximately US$11,502,476.26) was misappropriated within the 
education sector in 2002 alone. Ololube (2016) also claims that the Budget and 
Monitoring Committee of the Academic Staff Union of Universities at Obafemi 
Awolowo University accused the management of this institution of breaching due 
process and transparency in expending N3.5bn that was meant for the renovation of 
hostels and the construction of new lecture theatres. The money was part of the N100bn 
unrestricted funds that the federal government released to all Nigeria universities in 
2013. He further states that out of 701 development projects in Nigeria universities, 163 
(23.3%) are abandoned while 583 (76.7%) are continually under on-going projects. All 
these are an indication that government’s complacency that expands the scope of 
corruption in the education sector. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: THE JOURNEY SO FAR 
The Nigerian government has long identified corruption as a major obstruction to 
development (Aluko, 2002; Ameh, 2002; Dike, 2003; Shehu, 2005; Opara, 2007; Obuah, 
2010; Enakhimion, 2011; Adesote & Abimbola, 2012 and Egwemi, 2012). Even the World 
Bank (1997) shares this sentiment. In a bid to ameliorate the huge presence of 
corruption in the country, Nigeria has embarked on massive reforms by putting in place 
various anti-corruption legislations such as the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal 
Act, The Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act No 25, Money Laundering Act, The 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit, The National Drug Law Enforcement 
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Agency, The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives Act, Foreign 
Exchange Miscellaneous Provisions Act No 17 and many more (Igbuzor, 2008). The 
formulation of these legislations prompted the founder and former chairman of 
Transparency International, Dr. Peter Eigen, to acknowledge the fact that Nigeria has 
genuinely embraced the need to obliterate corruption (Eigen, 2006). 
Although it is obvious that the Nigerian government has recognised its corruption 
problem, and that it must implement its anti-corruption policies if the necessary 
reforms are to be achieved, more work needs to be put in place (Igbuzor, 2008). This 
may be traceable to various instances by the government where their actions did not 
match their intents, thus making the anti-corruption policies and the fight against 
corruption a mere symbolic approach. That is, there are currently many legislations 
intended to fight corruption in the country but there are fewer results (Igbuzor, 2008). 
According to Igbuzor (2008), the war against corruption in Nigeria has started as far 
back as 1966 when corrupt activities came under the public spotlight. This led to the 
designing of mechanisms to deal with corrupt activities. Popular among those 
mechanisms was the identification of appropriate sanctions. Combating corruption was, 
moreover, identified as one of the main reasons for the military intervention in Nigeria 
during 1966. Unfortunately, experience revealed that the military was even more corrupt 
than the civilian politicians who reigned the country beforehand (Igbuzor, 2008). 
From one dispensation to another, the fight against corruption was always 
reinvigorated. Before outlining some of the recent initiatives embarked upon by 
different Nigerian governments, some of the policy efforts previously put forward in 
curbing corruption is firstly recalled. Shehu (2005) mentioned the following: the 
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promulgation of the Public Officers (Investigation of assets) Decree No. 5 of 1966; the 
enactment of the Corrupt Practices Decree No. 38 of 1975, and the establishment of a 
Corrupt Practices Bureau; the introduction of the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) in 
1984; the introduction of a Code of Conduct for Public Officers, the promulgation of the 
Code of Conduct Decree and the establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau and 
Tribunal in 1989; the establishment of a national Committee on Corruption and 
Economic Crimes in 1989; and the introduction of War Against Indiscipline and 
Corruption (WAI&C) in 1994. 
Unfortunately, all these legislations failed largely due to the lack of political will 
(Ugoani, 2016). In 1999, the country was readmitted into a democratic dispensation after 
almost 33 years of military dictatorship. This readmission reignited the consensual 
charter against corruption. This dispensation, stretching from 29 May 1999 to date, is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Fourth Republic’ (Yagboyaju, 2011). Nigeria has also 
witnessed five general elections—1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. This means the fight 
against corruption has been a continuous one. Some of the anti-corruption 
establishments in the fourth republic, as enumerated by ActionAid Nigeria (2015: 37), 
include the ICPC, the EFCC and Transparency Initiatives (such as the Declaration of 
Assets, the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives, released by the 
Federal Government containing, among others, details of amounts paid from the 
Federal Account towards itself and its local governments). Faboyede, Mukoro, Oyewo 
and Akande (2015) also mentioned that other initiatives put forward in the fourth 
republic include the implementation of reforms in civil service, financial and banking 
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institutions and the establishment of the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit 
(BMPIU), which is also called the ‘due process mechanism’. 
The above shows a variety of legislations against corrupt activities in Nigeria but there 
are no specific legislations targeted at the education sector, in particular. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The logic of this chapter is to consider how corruption is understood in scholarly 
literature, in terms of the concept itself, its different forms, its ‘correlates’ (that is, 
factors associated with its presence) and the measures proposed to combat it. The study 
then draws on these understandings as a framework to serve as a guide in 
assessing/analysing the viability of the ways in which corruption is addressed in the 
ICPC reports. 
CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION 
It can be said that corruption is as old as humanity. Lipset and Lenz (2000: 112) boldly 
assert that: 
“corruption has been ubiquitous in complex societies from ancient Egypt, Israel, 
Rome and Greece down to the present. Dictatorial and democratic polities, feudal, 
capitalist and socialist economies, Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist cultures 
and religious institutions have all experienced corruption, but not, of course, in 
equal measure.”  
According to the above quote, corruption has cut across all spheres of human 
endeavours, from politics to religion (with the latter being a supposedly sacrosanct 
practice).  
An encompassing definition of corruption is yet to be accepted globally (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2015). From an etymological point of view, the word ‘corruption’ 
originated from the Latin word corrumpere, which means to destroy, spoil, seduce or 
bribe (Online Etymological Dictionary, 2018). Simply put, it makes other things worse 
than the state it met them. 
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Even though no definition for corruption has been accepted globally, some notable 
definitions have been attempted. For example, the World Bank defines corruption as 
the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, 1997: 8). This view of corruption 
connotes that occupants of a public office attract benefits to themselves which were 
hitherto not supposed to be theirs. In as much as the World Bank is one of the front 
runners against corruption, their definition of corruption seems very narrow. It suggests 
that corruption only takes place in the public sector and is, thus, unknown within the 
private sector. An individual does not need to hold an office ― whether public or private 
― to be corrupt. For example, student does not need to hold any office before engaging 
in a corrupt activity by bringing an external material to cheat during an examination.  
Another global agency, Transparency International, a non-governmental organisation 
that monitors and publicises corporate and political corruption in international 
development, posits that corruption involves the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain (Pope, 2000). This definition suggests that one must first be entrusted with power 
before one can be corrupt. 
Klitgaard (1998: 23) offers a more elaborated view on corruption. He suggests that 
corruption involves any “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
behaviour”. This view is similar to the definition given by the World Bank and 
Transparency International in that it holds the view that corruption only wiggles around 
the circuit of public office holders. In positing that corruption emanates from a 
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derivation from formal duties, it is implied that a non-public office holder cannot be 
corrupt. 
According to Sen (1999), corruption connotes a perversion or change from good to bad; 
specifically, it is the violation of established rules for personal gain or profit; that is, a 
situation where entrusted power to politicians is misused for selfish reasons. This view 
also focuses narrowly on those who are in public office, especially the political class. 
In a similar vein, Enakhimion (2011) describes corruption as the use of public resources 
for personal gain and the marginalisation of accepted norms of behaviour. Again, this 
focus is on public resources. Other authors who emphasise public or official power for 
private gain include Salisu (2000) and Myint (2000). 
Although Jain (2001) notes that it is difficult to arrive at a precise definition for 
corruption, he affirms that the consensus behind its definition is that it refers to the acts 
in which the power of the public office is used for personal gain in a manner that goes 
against the rules of the game. 
Sullivan (2001), to the contrary, takes a broader view on corruption by including all 
practices aiming at making money in a quick manner. When defining corruption, 
Ogbuke and Enojo (2007) as well as Asobie (2000) place greater emphasis on aspects 
such as dishonesty, immorality, non-ethics and illegality, as well as inducement to 
dishonesty. 
None of the definitions referred to provides for a full scope of corruption that this seeks. 
In recognising that corruption does not only exist within the public domain and it is not 
limited to the political sphere (Lipset and Lenz, 2000). Due to Wei’s (2017) experience, 
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namely that the existence of an accepted legal definition of corruption assisted to lessen 
the corruption rate in the United States of America, it is essential to reach a consensus 
over the behaviour regarded as leading to corruption in general. 
This study shall attempt its working definition of corruption. Afterward, it shall further 
attempt to define corruption in education. Firstly, corruption can be defined broadly as 
the misuse of resources for reasons that gives one unmerited favour or advantage.  
The term ‘public resources’ has been omitted from the above definition on the basis 
that, sometimes the resources that are being misused may not necessarily belong to the 
public. An example of this can be seen in a partnership where there are two or more 
people involved: one of them may tend to connive with fellow partners (either within 
or outside the partnership) to dubiously accrue more benefits to themselves. In this 
case, it does not necessarily have to do with resources from the public. 
CORRELATES OF CORRUPTION 
The Centre of Democracy and Governance (1999) as well as Othman, Shafie and Hamid 
(2014) highlight the importance of understanding the causes of corruption in order to 
fight it. It is, however, very difficult to pinpoint specific causes of corruption, either in 
Nigeria or anywhere else in the world. In arguing that the causes of corruption —  in 
essence, a product of rational thought — have their roots firmly embedded in the socio-
cultural practices and political and economic systems of a society, Shehu (2005) prefers 
to refer to the ‘correlates’ rather than the causes of corruption. Hence, it would be 
misleading to assume that factors associated with corruption in one country (such as 
Nigeria), would automatically contribute to corruption in other countries.  Shehu (2005) 
further argues that, although the presence of factors such as crime, unemployment, 
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poverty and underdevelopment in systems may serve as correlates of corruption, 
conducting corrupt activities directly stem from an “individual motivation based on 
intention, opportunity, target availability, the absence of capable guardians, as well as 
the accessibility of means and resources”. 
Another argument raised by Shehu (2005), concerning the difficulty experienced in 
ascertaining the causes of corruption is that, unlike other conventional crimes such as 
murder and robbery, corruption does not have a clear victim who is likely to complain 
and there is no visible occurrence that can be reported by witnesses. Quite often, those 
who have significant knowledge about the corrupt activity that has been perpetuated 
have, most likely, benefited from it, thus, making it ‘unnecessary’ to report such offence.  
Although many correlates of corruption may exist, those applicable to the educational 
sector can broadly be categorised into two main categories, namely economic and social 
correlates. 
Economic Correlates 
This category connotes those correlates that are finance or resource related. 
Poverty and/or a lack of funding 
According to Aluko (2002), poverty can be a possible correlate of corruption. He states 
that, as the economic gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen, the 
tendency of the poor to sell their conscience to the rich increases. Since poverty and 
unemployment go together, the poor (who may not have a steady source of income) can 
become vulnerable to all forms of social vices including corruption. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) as well as Ali and Isse (2003), subsequently conclude that countries with poor 
economies (including Nigeria) tend to have higher levels of corrupt practices which can 
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further make the growth rates worse. In other words, poverty can influence people to 
succumb to various kinds of temptations and pressures. Poor people and even 
economically strapped businesses can thus easily be ‘settled’ as they are willingly ready 
to do anything possible, without considering whether it is legal or illegal, just to survive. 
Their argument would often be that, because they are poor and do not have any rational 
option, they may indulge in corrupt practices. Johnston (2009) exemplifies this in a 
scenario where the police conduct shakedowns in a public market or set roadblocks in 
the countryside so that farmers or even taxi drivers must pay up for them to ply the 
road. Although it is illegal for the police to engage in such acts, the farmers may 
acquiesce to the request of the police. The drivers of trucks may be less likely to succumb 
than the petty farmers. While the police may eventually get certain amounts of money 
in their acts of extortion, they have helped to make the poor people poorer. This 
argument would suggest that an increase in corruption can be proportional to the rate 
of poverty and that the poorer the country, the less likely it is that they would allocate 
adequate resources to build an effective legal system (Dimant & Tosato, 2017) with the 
capacity to contain corruption. 
ActionAid Nigeria (2015) echoes Aluko’s (2002) sentiments about the correlates of 
corruption but adds that the relationship between poverty and corruption can also be 
an indirect one. That is, poverty does not automatically make one corrupt but it can 
lead one into a corrupt activity. 
However, poor people are not the only ones that may be corrupt. In Begovic’s (2005) 
argument, both the rich and poor can be corrupt. It depends on their levels of 
involvement. While a poor person can bribe a police officer for whatever benefit, the 
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rich can develop mechanisms to evade tax payment. In fact, they can even offer huge 
bribes as well to get certain favours. 
With regards to the education system, corruption within the administrative echelon can 
adversely affect the funding of the sector. Odia and Omofonwan (2007) state that 
Nigeria’s education system is experiencing gross under-funding and neglect with 
regards to the maintenance of physical facilities such as schools, classrooms, libraries 
and laboratories. Meier (2004) adds that conditions like this can put the school under 
pressure to yield to corrupt activities to raise funds. 
Poor salary structure 
There is general concord that low governmental wages not only lead to a decline in 
public service efficiency and productivity, but also creates incentives and opportunities 
for corrupt behaviour and the misuse of public resources (Chêne, 2009). This assertion 
is in line with a study carried out by Lambsdorff (2006). His study results indicate that 
low salaries and poor reward systems often compel civil servants to supplement their 
income illicitly. Gaomad (2005) adds that low-paid civil servants may be tempted to 
misuse their positions to accept bribes in order to make ends meet, especially when the 
consequence of their action is relatively low. Another study carried out in low-income 
countries by Azfar and Nelson (2007), however, confirms Lambsdorff’s (2006) argument 
that, although increasing government wages may reduce corruption levels, it will not 
necessarily eliminate it. 
With specific reference to the education sector, Meier (2004), poses that inadequate 
salaries and irregular or delayed payments tempt teachers to seek alternatives to 
supplement their income. He further stated that the fact that teachers’ salaries may be 
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inadequate was confirmed by a report from Moldova as teachers in large numbers left 
their positions simply because they could not survive on their salaries alone. Some, who 
did not leave, sought to supplement their income by engaging in extensive subsistence 
gardening or work several shifts. In addition, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (a 
global campaigner against corruption) claims that, although poverty is the main driver 
of corruption in this sector, insufficient funding for schools and salaries may also be a 
result of corruption and leakage further up the line (U4, 2006). 
Unemployment 
The symbiotic relationship between unemployment and corruption is highlighted by 
Udin and Udin (2013) stating that corruption is a product of unemployment. In 
agreement, Saha and Gounder (2009) state that people living in developed countries 
characterised by high unemployment and underemployment rates, would be willing to 
buy or sell civil service positions just to secure an earning position with stability and 
reasonable income opportunities for themselves leading to corrupt behaviour if due 
process is not followed. 
The results of a study carried out by Bouzid (2016) in developing countries, with regards 
to the education sector, indicate that resources can be diverted where self-motivated 
officials would use their discretionary power in selecting the candidates (teachers) of 
their choice who may be less qualified for the job while the more qualified teachers 
remain unemployed. 
Donors’ insubordination 
The gross under-funding plaguing the Nigerian education system has opened the doors 
for external players such as donors and lenders, whose presence alone can trigger 
opportunities for corruption. According to U4 (2006), donors and lenders tend to risk 
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flooding the education system with funds which the bureaucracies cannot absorb 
responsibly. For example, when mid- and low-mid level officials are tasked with 
implementing certain anti-corruption measures which may have emanated from the 
Ministry or the donor community, there is usually a special dynamic that comes into 
play. In order to obtain positive results under pressure, such personnel may attempt to 
cut corners, ignore already-set rules and bypass standard procedures, all hampering the 
delivery of education to the nation. 
Lack of infrastructure 
Meier (2004) suggests that poor quality of facilities such as roads, railways and 
telephones, may facilitate corruption. In education specifically, it may, for example 
make it difficult or even impossible for inspectors to visit schools, thus hampering the 
regulation of the distribution of funds allocated for school materials. 
Social Correlates 
These include those correlates that affect several institutions within the society. 
Weak enforcement mechanisms 
When enforcement mechanisms and prosecutorial institutions meant to deter and 
eliminate corruption are weak and thus incapable of sanctioning corrupt members of 
society, a vacuum for corruption is created. Corruption may even be the reason for such 
forces’ weaknesses (Rotimi, Obasaju, Lawal and IseOlorunkanmi, 2013). From an 
educational point of view, Animasahun (2013) lamented that one of the reasons why 
corruption in Nigeria’s education system is that many of the law enforcement agents 
use their positions to extort money from students in order to shield them from being 
prosecuted for corrupt behaviour. These enforcement agents cover the schools and 
specific students carry out their corrupt acts during examinations. 
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Slow judicial process 
Papaioannou (2011) emphasises that, legal inefficiency, due to conflicting laws, limited 
law enforcement and slow judicial processes, across and within countries, fosters 
corruption.  The absence of technological equipment (such as updated databases to 
keep records of judgements) can, according to Arvidsson and Folkesson (2010), for 
example, not only slow down court processes on corrupt practices but also makes it 
easier for corrupt behaviour to pass by unnoticed and unpunished. 
Within the education sector, if the judicial process regarding corrupt behaviour in 
schools is slow, it may not serve as a deterrent to other people. 
Political instability 
Dimant and Tosato (2016) suggest that the relationship between political instability and 
corruption can be viewed from two perspectives. First is the horizon effect, where if one 
has low stability, one’s short-term decision-making horizon could increase the 
likelihood that that one would engage in corrupt practices. Secondly, certain forms of 
corruption require a huge amount of time to complete. As a result, a corrupt individual 
overseeing, for example infrastructure projects, would embark on extreme political 
stability until that project is completed as this would enable the incumbent and private 
sector to establish a corrupt relationship. Abu, Karim and Aziz (2015) are of the opinion 
that political instability (alongside corruption) is one of the main reasons why the 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), including Nigeria, region as 
well as its education system is still largely underdeveloped as this region has been 
blighted with series of military take-over over the years. 
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Lack of political will 
According to Ugoani (2016), political will involves the demonstration of a genuine 
aspiration of political leaders and significant stakeholders to address the causes and 
effects of corruption at the systemic level. Furthermore, without the institutionalising 
of political will, the war against corruption will only end in futility. This seems to be 
case of Nigeria. Even with many anti-corruption legislations, the huge presence of 
corruption is felt in all sectors, including education. 
Inefficient bureaucratic and administrative structures 
Nwankwo, Ananti and Madubueze (2015) state that bureaucratic corruption emanates 
from improper administrative procedures being followed. An inefficient bureaucracy 
can, according to Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2004) be a correlate of corruption, 
especially when civil servants or bureaucrats exploit their powers of discretion, 
delegated to them by government, to further their selfish interests by engaging in illegal 
and/or unauthorised activities. Such exploitation may, as set forward by Meier (2004) 
and U4 (2006), be due to the fact that inadequate organisational structures usually fail 
to provide incentives for improved performance by their servants and for control 
mechanisms and sanctions regulating the discretionary power allocated to such 
servants. In many developing countries like Nigeria, authoritarian and centralised 
systems hinder opportunities for growth and a generally weak system paves the way for 
the staff to obtain undue advantage from their positions. For example, when allocated 
funds, as Ololube (2016) asserts, are not duly disbursed by the school gatekeepers, this 
can create room for corruption.  
Low societal and cultural ethics 
The Nigerian society is known for having the culture of celebrating the affluent 
irrespective of the source of their wealth. Some members of the Nigerian society have 
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imbibed a ‘get-rich’ syndrome (Moyosore, 2015). Where societal values condone and 
promote corrupt behaviour, people who acquire affluence and buy influence through 
corrupt enrichment are usually bestowed with national and local respect and honours 
(Dike, 2002 and Imhonopi & Ugochukwu, 2013). What is even more damaging about 
such aculture is that it sets the tone for a new breed of public servants to engage in 
corrupt practices (Okolo & Akpokighe, 2014). According to Maduegbuna (2005), one 
main reason why this culture may continue is that the benefits of corruption tend to 
outweigh the consequences of being caught and prosecuted. Relating to the Nigerian 
education sector, Adebisi, Adebisi and Arogunde (2012) believe that a ‘get-rich’ 
syndrome can force students, teachers and administrative officials go engage in 
examination malpractice for quick money. 
Lack of community involvement 
Corruption can come into effect when the public (direct stakeholders) does not 
participate in the monitoring, supervision and management of public investments (from 
the first phase of planning to the final stage of implementation), especially when these 
investments or allocations are for beneficiaries such as school administration, teachers, 
parents and students, (Transparency International, 2011). Meier (2004) maintains that, 
in the case of school administration, if parents are not involved or given a sense of 
ownership, there is every likelihood that they would not hold the teachers and 
administrators accountable for their actions. In the same vein, if the public is oblivious 
of the expected educational outcomes from schools, there is a tendency that they may 
not claim their children’s right to education. 
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Absence of whistle-blowing culture 
In most societies, there is fear of being apprehended if one reports corrupt cases to the 
relevant authorities. A study carried out by Transparency International in Vietnam 
revealed that most of the people interviewed for the study claimed that parents believe 
that, when teachers are regularly given gifts, their children’s performance at school 
would be positively influenced (Transparency International, 2011). These parents did not 
perceive this act as corruption, but rather as a normal token of respect to teachers. 
Although this act of gift-giving can be seen as an outward sign of ‘Asian Values’, it can 
also be used as a catalyst for teachers and parents to flirt with and engage in corrupt 
practices while having their conscience gradually eased. In this case, none would see the 
need to report such. 
Emphasis on certification 
Anzene (2014) states that, if there is huge emphasis on paper certification in a society, 
instead of emphasis on knowledge, skills and competence, the resultant effect would be 
an increase in the occurrence of examination malpractice. The Nigerian society places 
huge emphasis on paper qualification above competence. This, as Adebisi, Adebisi and 
Arogunde (2012) put it, would make most Nigerian students do whatever is required, 
whether legal or illegal, to get a paper qualification but at the end become 
unemployable. 
FORMS OF CORRUPTION 
Just as defining the term corruption has not been easy, also categorising its forms has 
been problematic. According to Morris (2011), an easy way of differentiating forms of 
corruption is by centring it on the institutional location of the public official involved 
(for example, corruption within the executive branch, the legislature or the judiciary, 
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local government, the police, teachers, customs agents, as well as building and 
educational inspectors). However, he further outlines two broad categories of 
corruption based on institutional location as ‘upper-level’ and ‘lower-level’ corruption; 
where upper-level corruption involves presidents, ministers, members of the legislature, 
governors and other high-ranking officials: lower-level corruption involves ordinary 
civil servants. 
In categorising corruption, Begovic (2005) identifies three basic categories. The first 
category refers to corrupt ways of achieving or speeding-up the materialisation of some 
specific right that a citizen or legal entity is entitled to (corruption without theft). For 
example, when a person bribes a civil servant in charge of issuing a passport that the 
briber/corruptor is entitled to. In this case, civil servants are corrupted to do their job 
or to do it faster than usually, instead of not doing it at all. The second category is 
administrative corruption where there is violation of legal rules or there is a very biased 
enforcement of the rules. The third category is termed ‘state capture’. This refers to 
corruption that is aimed at changing the existing rules and regulations into rules and 
regulations that favour the interests of the corruptor. That is, public policies are 
formulated to favour a few oligarchs and not the public. 
Another attempt to categorise corruption, put forward by Vargas-Hernandez (2009), 
classifies corruption into three broad categories: political, economic and public 
administration. Political corruption, in this case, refers to behaviours that deviate from 
the principles that guide politics and policies where decisions are adapted with abuse of 
power. Economic corruption, on the other hand, refers to the sacrifice of the principal’s 
interest for the agent’s interest which results in making profits, while administrative 
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corruption refers to the behaviours of public agents neglecting the principles of 
efficiency, truthfulness and rightfulness. 
Mashal (2011) categorises corruption into three types. First, grand corruption which 
connotes the acts of the political elite or selected officials exploiting their power to make 
economic policies. Second, bureaucratic corruption (also known as petty corruption and 
it is the most common form) connotes the corrupt acts of bureaucrats in their dealings 
with either their superior (political elite) or with the public. The third category is 
legislative corruption. This has to do with the manner and the extent to which the voting 
behaviour of legislators can be influenced, usually through bribery. 
In the views of Keeper (2012) and Mussie (2016), corruption can generally be categorised 
into six types: political, bureaucratic, private, collective, extractive and redistributive 
forms of corruption. Political or grand corruption takes place when politicians, political 
decision-makers or state agents, who are entitled to make and enforce the laws are 
corrupt themselves. Bureaucratic or petty corruption refers to corruption that happens 
in the public administration, at the implementation end of politics such as auditing, 
legislation and institutional arrangements. Corruption is said to be private or individual 
when private benefits are sought and collected by the corrupt actor, his family or close 
friends whereas collective corruption takes place when a conspiracy between 
individuals easily extends into a larger practice involving colleagues, partners, 
assistants, patrons and superiors. In extractive corruption, resources flow from the 
society to the state while redistributive corruption sees resources flow from the state to 
society (Mussie, 2016).  
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This study adopted the simplest and most useful categorisation of corruption, namely 
petty, grand and systemic. However, within that these categories, sub-categories are 
introduced. 
Petty corruption 
Since the word ‘petty’ connotes ‘small’, petty corruption would etymologically connote 
the corrupt practices that are perpetuated on a small scale. This type of corruption is 
low-level in nature and usually occurs in the common places. Bhargava (2005) sees petty 
corruption as the payment of comparatively small amounts of money intended to 
facilitate routine official transactions; these transactions may include customs clearance 
and the issuing of routine permits. Lambert-Mongiliansky, Mujumdar and Radner 
(2007) warn that the usage of the term ‘petty corruption’ should not be looked at from 
its total impact on government income or policy’s perspective but on the size of each of 
the transactions that constitute a corrupt activity. To this end, Lambert-Mongiliansky 
et al. (2008) describe it as anti-poor, anti-development, anti-growth and anti-
investment as well as a creator of an environment that undermines the legitimacy of the 
state. Poeschl and Ribeiro (2012) also state that middle or low-level public officials who 
may be underpaid, are often involved in this form of corruption but assert that although 
petty corruption involves small amounts of money, it generally harms the poorest 
members of a society in their interactions with public services such as schools, hospitals, 
police, tax administration and many more. That is, public officials abuse their powers 
for small bribes, benefits or more serious forms of corruption on managerial levels. 
Unfortunately, because of the ‘small amounts’ involved in it, Van Vuuren (2004) notes 
that it is often overlooked as an area of concern in the public debate.  
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Malachi (2016) adds that bureaucratic (or administrative) corruption can also be petty 
corruption. This is because bureaucratic principles are usually broken or undermined 
by public officials. This corruption is corruption of need, that is, public officials would 
cash in on the fact the citizens need certain services (from the police, schools, tax offices 
etc.). A good example of this form of corruption would be cases, as cited by Begovic 
(2005), where an individual would pay bribes for services that they are originally entitled 
to and, in most cases, the bribes are paid to hasten processes. 
Grand corruption 
Grand corruption is the type of corruption that pitches its tents around politicians. 
Malachi (2016) states that it can also be called political corruption. In this type of 
corruption, politicians and political decision-makers, who are entitled to formulate, 
establish and implement the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt. In 
other words, the people who are meant to work towards the reduction of corruption, 
directly or indirectly, contribute to its growth. Jain (2001) sees grand corruption as those 
acts of the political elite by which they exploit their power to make economic policies; 
that is, this occurs when the political elite change either national policies or the 
implementation of national policies to serve their own interests at some cost to the 
populace. In the words of Robben (1998), grand corruption connotes “the purposeful 
and secretive violation of the standards of moral behaviour in a certain political 
community by politicians [and/or any other corrupt party or parties].” 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2016) states that grand 
corruption occurs when leaders maximise personal wealth rather than the welfare and 
wellbeing of the population. This is made possible because of the large amounts of or 
complete control over political powers leaders have. Leaders would use a fraction of the 
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wealth that they have fraudulently amassed from the state to buy the loyalty of the 
people they see as the key players in the running of the state. This position makes it very 
difficult for such a leader to be questioned or prosecuted as the people who were meant 
to maintain checks and balances in the state have already been bought over. Thus, such 
leaders are helped to remain in office for as long as they want as both civic rights and 
public institutions that may rise in opposition to any form of breaches in social contracts 
would be undermined. Kenny and Søreide (2008) give examples of grand corruption as 
allegations of political corruption in too expensive power project in India in 1993; 
allegations of bribery for telecom and railway contracts in Costa Rica, Taiwan and Africa 
from 2000 – 2003; alleged corruption behind power plant deal in Philippines in 2001; 
transfers made to influence the award of water contracts in Italy in 2002; and a biased 
decision by the Tanzanian government in favour of incompetent electricity in February 
2008.  
Systemic corruption 
Etymologically, it can be said that systemic corruption is simply corruption existing 
within systems of an organisation or country. In the view of Nicholls, Daniel, Bacarese 
and Hatchard (2011: 4), systemic corruption refers to “corruption brought about, 
encouraged or promoted by the system itself.” In this kind of situation, Laver (2014) 
opines that this problem (systemic corruption) does not only reflect an absence of 
[adherence to] formal rules (which can sometimes be a problem) but also reflects a 
competing and conflicting set of informal rules or norms. Similarly, when systemic 
corruption is in place, it does not mean that formal rules do not exist but rather that the 
formal rules are overpowered by the informal rules or norms. It is the outcome of a 
government, organisation or process that is flawed with non-compliance to the rule of 
 
30 | P a g e  
 
law or code of conduct. Systemic corruption is found within the confines of a group of 
people, sector or institution and thus has a massive presence at all levels of society. 
Within systemic corruption, corrupt activities are seen as a way of life. It is expected 
that every individual within that society knows that, although it is unethical to be 
corrupt, it is also not avoidable simply because it has been structured as the ‘easier’ route 
to get what you want. According to Hope and Chikulo (2000), systemic corruption is 
intrinsically connected to a set of ethics that has shaped the way and manner that 
society operates. Here, corrupt activities tend to be normalised and regularised where 
both the public and private sectors are no exceptions. The informal rules and norms 
encourage corrupt behaviour from citizens and officials. This kind of corruption—also 
known as endemic corruption—is clearly not a special kind of corrupt practice but a 
situation where all the institutions and processes of the state have been dominated by 
corrupt groups and individuals, where most people do not have alternative means of 
dealing with corrupt officials (U4, 2011). Hence, officials and individuals at every level 
engage in corrupt activities and the citizens are aware of this practice. The citizens 
themselves know that there are extensive practices involving bribes, embezzlements of 
funds, unlawful acquisition of certain properties or favours etc. going on in the state. 
Stefes (2008: 3) notes that this type of corruption “inevitably affects political and 
economic developments.”  
However, systemic corruption does not happen on its own. There are many factors that 
would necessitate systemic corruption. Lorena and Raul (2001) list such factors as a 
culture of impunity, low pay, lack of transparency, conflicting incentives, discretionary 
powers and monopolistic powers. A very good example of systemic corruption in Nigeria 
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was itemised by Keeper (2012) where an Australian national asserted that he was 
compelled by his Nigerian principals (who were in government by then) to inflate a 
contract to the sum of N5.5bn.  
Within the three main forms of corruption introduced above, one can also categorise 
forms of corruption as financial, administrative, academic or professional. However, 
there is a long list of more specific types of corruption that falls within these three main 
categories and four subcategories. It is useful to have some kind of a list of such corrupt 
acts, with the definitions of what these acts entail. Some corrupt acts can overlap across 
two main categories or subcategories. 
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 Petty Grand System 
Financial Illegal fees for 
admission 
 
School funds diverted 
for private interest 
 
Bribes paid to get 
admitted or employed 
by a school 
Taking too much 
responsibilities beyond 
one’s capacity to make 
more money at the 




funds for political 
campaigns 
Embezzlement of 




Misallocation of talents 
 
Unfairness and 
partiality in education 
 
Favouritism 
Waste and unequal use 
of education resources 
 
Misallocation of talents 
 
Unfairness and 
partiality in education 
 
Favouritism 
Academic Different categories of 
bribe paid to be 
promoted, obtain a 






Taking too much 
responsibilities beyond 
one’s capacity to make 
more money at the 
expense of the 
students 
Institutions set up as 
certificate mills 
Professional Sexual favours for 




salaries from more 
than one employment 
at the same time 
Favouritism 
Table 1: Classification of examples of specific corrupt acts in education 
The table above was derived from Amundsen (2000), Chapman (2003) as well as Ojo 
and Ofojebe (2008). 
Financial corruption 
Financial corruption in education is seen where those at the helms of affairs within the 
educational sector direct their activities towards looting the treasury of the sector or 
institutions within the sector. They use their positions to orchestrate financial 
corruption in education. Transparency International (2009) gives examples of this kind 
of corruption as government’s under-funding of the education sector, misallocation of 
schools’ resources and use of schools’ funds for different projects other than its intended 
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use. Others include the allocation of specific allowances (such as fellowships, subsidies 
and grants), the offering of bribes, fraud, extortion embezzlements and ghost deliveries. 
Administrative corruption 
Administrative corruption in education is similar to the above-mentioned form of 
education corruption. Although, both forms involve people in top positions, the former 
is mostly financially-related while the latter entails every form of corruption that arises 
from the use of an official position to effect bias in their transactions. In this category, 
the corrupt activities go beyond financial benefits. They include, for example, the partial 
distribution of educational materials (textbooks, furniture, transport facilities and 
school meals), purchasing unnecessary equipment, bias in the appointment and 
deployment of educational stakeholders/teachers (nepotism and favouritism), 
discrimination against or the victimisation of teachers because of their political, social 
or ethnic affiliations, delay in the payment of salaries, and unauthorised deductions 
being made. According to Poisson (2010), corrupt practices that are usually associated 
with administration include the administration of examinations, admissions to 
university and/or the accreditation of institutes of higher learning. 
Academic corruption 
Academic corruption, specifically in education, as seen by Ojo and Ofojebe (2008), can 
result when policies in education are merely watered down for individuals within the 
academic setup in order for them to get certain benefits they are not qualified for. One 
of the dangers of this practice is that it encourages laziness and complacency among 
educational practitioners. Examples of this form of academic corruption include 
plagiarism in research, teacher incompetence, examination malpractice, fraud in the 
selection of authors, the bypass of copyright law, impersonation, certificate forgery, the 
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selling of makeshift copies of textbook extracts, and lecturers having up to five jobs at 
different universities where their effectiveness would be negatively hampered yet 
receiving their full salaries. 
Professional corruption 
Professional corruption, specifically in education, is similar to academic corruption in 
education. In this case, the focus is on teacher behaviour, otherwise known as 
professional misconduct, where teachers’ professional ethics are undermined to carry 
out a corrupt activity. The main difference between this and academic corruption in 
education is that the former does not always relate to academics. Examples of this would 
include teachers’ absenteeism, ghost workers, illegal fees (for school entrance, exams, 
assessment and private tutoring) sexual harassment of students by teachers, payment 
for information that should be provided free, selecting/suppressing information, 
irregularity in producing and publishing information as well as manipulating data. 
Bakari and Leach (2009) and Collins (2009) agree that sexual exploitation is a frequent 
form of professional misconduct in sub-Saharan Africa. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION 
According to the World Bank (1997), understanding the consequences of corruption on 
an economy or political system can help in identifying specific types of activities that 
constitute corruption. Although most scholars see the consequences of corruption from 
a negative point of view, interestingly there are also some who see some positive effect 
in corruption. One of the first scholars to have highlighted the positive role that 
corruption plays in the growth of any economy is Nathaniel Leff. Voskanyan (2000) 
states that since 1964, Nathaniel Leff’s article titled, ‘Economic Development through 
Bureaucratic Corruption’ has remained one of the most fondly cited articles when it 
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comes to the positive consequences of corruption. Voskanyan maintains that, 
“corruption in the form of bribing can be an important arm in the hands of 
entrepreneurs seeking to do business with a hostile or indifferent government and may, 
indeed stimulate the development process.” Heckelman and Powell (2008) echo 
Voskanyan’s (2000) sentiments by stating that corruption is needed to get things done 
in much of the third world. A bribe can help increase efficiency in some sense by cutting 
off unnecessary time needed to process licenses and paperwork. 
However, most scholars have negative perceptions of corruption. According to 
Voskanyan (2000), studies have shown that, if corruption is tolerated, there is a high 
chance of serious negative effects on the development of the economy and political 
landscape of a country. All the consequences of corruption can be subdivided into two: 
economic and social. These two sub-divisions are however inter-related. 
Economic consequences 
With regard to negative consequences, corruption can be detrimental to 
entrepreneurship, taxation, local private investments, planning, and foreign aid 
(Amundsen, 1999). Those who indulge in giving and receiving bribes exploit the wealth 
of the nation. Thus, many citizens become increasingly poor, thereby increasing the 
poverty level of an entire country. Such corruption often becomes systemic 
(Onimajesin, 2008). 
Secondly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is generally found to be on the decline in a 
corrupt society. With globalisation being a major trend in the last two decades, FDI has, 
however, been on the increase. There have been concerns with the rate that corruption 
has risen in pari passu with globalisation. Because of the latter, international strategic 
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alliances (as seen in mergers and acquisitions) have been based much more on mutual 
trust (Castro & Nunes, 2013) than on business standards, government ethics and 
regulations becoming more difficult. 
Corruption also reduces productivity over time. A study carried out by Lambsdorff 
(2003), found that corruption can drastically reduce productivity in several ways. One 
of these ways is that governments would either be unable or unwilling to meet up with 
the demands on public welfare because of wasteful rent seeking or misleading public 
decisions. 
Another economic effect of corruption is unemployment. According to a study carried 
out in Pakistan by Qadar and Muhammed (2013), it was revealed that unemployment 
can be an outcome of corruption. This is seen in the inequality in employee selection 
criteria from the employers. 
In as much as corruption can speed up business transactions as seen above (as a positive 
consequence of corruption), it can also cause huge delays in the economic growth of 
any country. Ahmed, Ullah and Arfeen (2012) argue that the economic growth of a 
nation is delayed when there are delays in the bureaucratic processes necessary for 
investment because of the many unlawful benefits inherent in an investment or 
transaction. 
Social consequences 
The effects of corruption most often fall on the people who are not privileged to be in 
the ruling class. Its damaging effects arise from the unbalanced allocation of resources 
since the resources are diverted away from the function that they would have been if 
there were not corruption. With corruption in place, only a selected few are privileged 
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to enjoy the wealth of the nation. This creates a hugely unequal divide between the rich 
and poor where the corrupt officials tend to thrive in affluence and the individuals who 
miss out wallow in abject poverty (Johansson & Lext, 2013). 
Every society has laws and regulations that are meant to protect the interest of the 
public in areas such as environmental control, building codes, banking regulations and 
traffic laws. If any of these laws are violated for economic gain through any corrupt 
means, it can cause serious social harm. Examples of such social harm include soil 
erosion which can result from illegal water-logging; violation of building codes by both 
corrupt officials and contractors which can result in the collapse of buildings; failure to 
maintain proper fire prevention and safety regulations can cause buildings (and even 
people) to go up in flames (Myint, 2000). 
According to Bonga, Chiminya and Mudzingiri (2015), corruption affects service 
delivery. They assert that when corruption causes a misdirection of the assignment of 
unemployment or disability benefits, then there will be delays in the payment of 
pensions and the weakening of the provision of basic public services (which in such 
cases, the poor suffer most). This situation deters social safety. 
Corruption in education will lead to a generally weak education system. Transparency 
International (2011) opines that, where the level of corruption in education management 
is relatively low, there would be considerable leakages of financial resources such as 
embezzlement and fraud. Since budgetary allocation for education is usually the biggest 
in most countries and usually administered by the state, corruption risks tend to 
increase when these allocations are decentralised, especially when they are not backed 
up with effective control mechanisms (Transparency International, 2011). 
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Memory and Memory (2013) hold the view that corruption causes a decline in the 
benefits of education, especially at tertiary level, is expected to contribute meaningfully 
to national development though workforce training and helping individuals develop 
proper values that are needed for survival in society. Unfortunately, a few universities 
are now seen as projects for money-making. 
A low quality of education outcomes is another consequence of corruption in education. 
In a study carried out by Transparency International (2011) in Vietnam, it was discovered 
that corruption has a huge impact on the overall quality of education in this country as 
the commitment of teachers and the earnestness of students were most affected. This 
situation further creates a poor atmosphere for study and work that demotivates 
educational stakeholders and impedes the entire system. Udenka (2013) states that as a 
result, many schools would give high scores to their students in order to attract more 
students and the products of such a system would be of low quality as they do not 
properly go through the system. 
COMBATIVE MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION 
The fight against corruption has been a global one. Many bodies, agencies and even 
governments have adopted measures to fight it. However, apart from proposing actual 
measures, scholars also suggest that the success of these measures depends on broader 
social and political conditions. 
Langseth (1999) notes that economic and social progress, democratic values, a strong 
civic society as well as the rule of law under good governance are some of the basic tools 
needed to champion any anti-corruption reform. Gonzalez de Asis (2006) believes that 
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with a strong political will as a precondition alongside the simplification of 
administrative procedures and citizen participation, corruption can be reduced. 
With a twenty-year plan for Poland, a team of researchers outlined the following as what 
should be considered if the fight against corruption would be realistic: 
“…changing citizens’ attitudes in such a way that the absence of corruption is 
considered a normal state of affairs; instilling in the public consciousness the belief 
that the authorities have a responsibility to continually fight against corruption; 
carrying out activities along three tracks: prevention, law enforcement and 
education; putting Poland in the top ten EU countries in terms of transparency…” 
(Czubek, Kopinska, Sawicki, Wojciechowska-Nowak and Wojciechowicz, 2010: 6) 
Kaufann (1997) itemises two main anti-corruption strategies as ex-post or curative 
measures and ex-ante or preventive measures. Under the ex-post measures, a corrupt 
activity happens first before the corruptor is caught and prosecuted while the ex-ante 
measures advocate for the use of prevention as a way of reducing corruption. 
Like Kaufman, Saunders (2014), argues that any organisation or institution that seeks to 
fight corruption can either use a reactive response strategy or proactive, or preventive 
response strategy. While reactive strategies consist of compliance training, integrity 
testing, zero tolerance policies, codes of conduct, business collective actions, supplier 
“white-lists” rewards to whistle-blowers and integrity pacts, proactive strategies include 
whistle-blower hotlines, whistle-blower protection and the supply of “black-lists”. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD: 2016) proposes that 
efforts towards improving governance frameworks and strengthening actions on 
prevention as well as the detection and sanctioning of corruption in following a holistic 
and coordinated approach, can bring an end to corruption. 
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Other writers list more specific measures of combating corruption. For example, a 
Senior Investigation Officer of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Namibia, Abraham 
Nikolous Ihalua (2012), outlines five effective measures to prevent and combat 
corruption. These measures include investigation of corrupt individuals and activities, 
prosecution of corrupt individuals after investigations, adjudication of corrupt matters 
in reputable courts of laws, as well as the confiscation of the proceeds of corruption. 
McCusker (2006) reviewed the anti-corruption strategies in Australia and categorised 
them into three schools of thought: interventionism, management and organisational 
integrity. According to him, in interventionism, the relevant authorities first wait for 
corruption to take place before moving to arrest and prosecute the offender. 
Management refers to when individuals who would tend to engage in a corrupt practice 
are discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate systems, 
procedures and protocols. Organisational integrity, on the other hand, refers to the 
integration of an organisation’s operational systems, measures that control corruption 
and ethical standards so that a norm of ethical behaviour is created. 
Intervention and prosecution 
This refers to a situation where relevant agencies intervene, investigate, arrest and 
prosecute individuals guilty of corrupt behaviour. Most countries have adopted this 
strategy by establishing anti-graft watchdogs (anti-corruption commissions and 
agencies) to carry out this process. These agencies are usually empowered by the 
constitution to prosecute offenders. Those confronted with corrupt practices and 
administrative bias can go to these agencies to report such incidents with the view that 
the perpetrators will face the wrath of the law. Langseth (2004) admonishes that these 
agencies―which are also known as complaint mechanisms―should not only be 
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permanent institutions in every country but also, there should be as many as possible; 
they should also be run in a way where both citizens and public servants will be able to 
report any form of corrupt activities. In this regard, the security of the reporters 
(whistle-blowers) should also be of paramount concern for these agencies. 
Ideally, such agencies should be able to reach beyond the borders of their country. One 
of the provisions of the OECD Convention in 2000 (OECD, 2000) was that member 
country must establish a jurisdiction to prosecute and punish corrupt individuals even 
when they travel abroad. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) suggested that, for this 
to happen, the rule of law must be strengthened (backed up with the right political will). 
Since the objective of a country/organisation is to get rid of corruption as quickly as 
possible, attention can be given to those cases of corruption that involve prominent 
figures, where huge amounts of money have been carted or service delivery has been 
impaired. These individuals can be used as scapegoats by being given heavy sanctions 
to instil integrity consciousness on the citizens. Waziri (2011) adds that this can be 
achieved by establishing special courts to help quicken the process, which are on the 
same level as the Court of Appeal, as seen in the Philippines.  Afterwards, these anti-
corruption agencies can embark on proactive measures, like establishing new ethical 
principles and (re)training of government officials. Langseth (2004) further advises that, 
in a situation where there is a huge presence of corruption, certain forms of amnesty 
can be appropriated. 
According to McCusker (2006), anti-corruption strategies advocate retribution, 
rehabilitation and deterrence. However, its drawbacks include that harm has already 
occurred and cannot be undone; the majority of the crimes remain unreported; and that 
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the demand on the finite resources will incontrovertibly become infinite given the 
degree of supervision necessary to ensure that the deterrence effect operates. 
Management 
In the view of McCusker (2006), management (as an anti-corruption strategy) connotes 
a situation where those individuals and/or agencies that look forward to engaging in 
corrupt behaviour can either be discouraged or prevented from doing such by 
appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. Management can also reduce or 
eliminate those opportunities that, in one way or the other, create a platform for 
corruption to take place. 
One of the ways of limiting such opportunities is establishing direct contact between 
the government and the governed. Gonzalez de Asis (2006) notes that the reform 
process and the sustainability of local government integrity can be propelled when 
citizens’ participation in government activities is increased. This will help the people 
not only to know the areas where corruption takes place but also to be aware of the 
factors that promote its occurrence. The higher the number of the people who take part 
in this practice, the more the set of interests that maintain incentives for corruption, 
emerges. Jha and Sarangi (2014) highlight that the internet can be used as a bridge 
between government and those governed. It can be done via electronic government, 
otherwise known as e-government. E-government does, however, not provide a face-to-
face interaction, and thus reduces the chances for any corrupt activity such as bribery.  
Part of preventing corruption through management is providing reasonable salaries and 
incentives for civil servants. As seen above, poverty and low salary structure are some 
correlates of corruption. In fact, a study in Bangladesh revealed that one of the reasons 
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why corruption had been on the increase in this country was the low salary structure 
(Mahmood, 2010: 106). The study concludes that an increase in salary would lead to the 
reduction of corrupt activities. Sharing the same sentiment, Chêne, (2013) upholds the 
‘efficiency wage’ argument, entailing that higher salaries raise the stakes of engaging in 
corruption. This means that the higher the salary, the riskier or costlier it is for 
individuals to engage in corrupt activities because of the fear of losing their well-paying 
jobs. 
Management further connotes educating, sensitising and enlightening individuals 
about the impact of corruption on society. This creates a significant correlation between 
education and corruption. A study carried out by Transparency International in India, 
for example, showed that the state of Kerala was the least corrupt state in India and one 
of the contributory factors was that it had the highest literacy level in the country (Singh 
& Pandey, 2010). This suggests that the uneducated may not be aware of the processes 
and provisions put in place to seek justice. Corrupt officials can cash in on the 
uneducated to exploit them. So, the more educated people are, the better they would 
understand their rights and responsibilities. The government is then tasked with the 
responsibility to enlighten the citizenry on what constitutes corruption and ways of 
avoiding it. This can be integrated into the curriculum and taught to students from 
primary to tertiary levels of education. School clubs and civil societies can also be of a 
great help as well as seminars, workshops, symposia, commercials and pamphlets. The 
enactment of laws that would give the media freedom to comment on corrupt practices 
can also be encouraged. This strategy is, however, likely to be more effective in tackling 
petty corruption than grand or systemic corruption (Singh & Pandey, 2010). 
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Since management attempts to create a set of rules that would discourage differently 
motivated individuals from corruption, McCusker (2006) argues that the drawback of 
such a strategy is that its success is fragmented, “intercepting the less scheming 
‘corruptee’ but not the more damaging highly planned exploits of others.” Another 
drawback is that it does not take cognisance of the impact of market forces. These 
market forces come into play, for example, when public officials are approached to 
provide confidential information in exchange for money. While some might see it as too 
great a risk and decline, others would want to raise the price of that information, thereby 
increasing the chances of corruption to take place. 
Organisational Integrity 
Organisational integrity entails the integration of an organisation’s operational systems, 
control strategies for corruption and ethical standards as a norm of ethical behaviour to 
be created (McCusker, 2006). This strategy assumes that a deviation from the already 
established ethical behaviour stems from the organisation and not from the individuals 
that make up the organisation. It can be adopted by both private and government 
parastatals. For example, it is the responsibility of the government to collect taxes, 
receive foreign aid and process budgetary allocations. The more open and transparent 
the processes involved are, the less the chances for corruption to occur. Here, 
transparency rests on the process of government, rather than on the individual acts of 
officials. 
The elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic processes and regulations can help 
stabilise the integrity of the organisation and assist to improve the speed at which 
corruption related cases are handled. Gonzalez de Asis (2006) notes that, when 
government officials are consistent, identifying potentially corrupt patterns of officials 
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becomes easier. This will also reduce the delays in day-to-day transactions such as 
licensing and approvals from relevant authorities. When this is maintained, it would 
create an enabling environment for the people to demand accountability from 
government or organisation. This approach best tackles systemic corruption. 
With corrupt activities being reported almost everywhere, one may wonder if the 
available preventive measures are potent enough to ameliorate it. However, the 
literature above shows that, if well managed, corruption can indeed be ameliorated to 
some degree. 
CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
This conceptual framework is derived from literature reviewed above. It outlines: 
- A definition of corruption; 
- the correlates of corruption; 
- the forms of corruption; 
- the consequences of corruption, and 
- the main measures of fighting corruption 
The conceptual framework presented in chapter two, thus far, was based entirely on 
literature. The framework was adapted to incorporate additional consequences that are 
referred to in the data but did not appear in the initial conceptual framework. Elements 
referred to in the 2009 ICPC report such as ‘citizenry’s negative national perception’ and 
the effect of corruption on ‘the developmental efforts and survival of a nation’ were 
included. The report also offered examples of combative measures that did not appear 
in the literature review such as ‘mobilisation’ i.e. enlisting and fostering public support 
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(ICPC, 2009: 10) and ‘research and documentation’ for deepening an understanding of 
corruption (ICPC, 2009: 14). 
The elements of the conceptual framework that have been derived from initial data 
analysis are highlighted in bold italics, below. 
Definition 
Recall that corruption has been broadly defined by this study as the misuse of resources 
for reasons that gives one unmerited favour or advantage. 
Correlates 
There are two broad correlates of corruption: economic and social correlates.  
Economic correlates 
a) Poverty. Example: Where there are no funds for schools to embark on certain 
projects, the schools may in turn look elsewhere to raise funds, thus increasing 
the chances of corruption. This refers not only to the poverty of communities but 
also to the poverty of the schools.  
b) Poor salary structure. Example: Where teachers are not well-paid, they may tend 
to look for other sources of income, thereby increasing the chances of being 
corrupt. 
c) Unemployment: Those who do not have any source of income may be tempted 
do just about anything to raise income, thereby increasing the chances of 
engaging in a corrupt practice. 
d) Donors’ influence: Donors are able to use their influence to elicit corrupt 
practices. 
e) Lack of infrastructure: People can capitalise on the lack of good infrastructure to 
engage in a corrupt activity. 
 
47 | P a g e  
 
Social correlates 
a) Weak enforcement mechanisms: When the mechanisms put in place to fight 
against corruption are weak, corruption is more likely to thrive. 
b) Slow judicial process: Similarly, a slow judicial process will encourage corrupt 
behaviour in any society. 
c) Political instability: Political instability hampers the fight against corruption. 
d) Lack of political will: Where there is no political will in the fight against 
corruption, any measure put in place to curb it will be symbolic. 
e) Inefficient bureaucratic and administrative structure: When bureaucratic and 
administrative processes are not followed, this can give rise to corruption. 
f) Low society and cultural ethics: A society that does not have a culture that works 
against corruption indirectly gives room for its growth. 
g) Lack of community involvement: Community involvement can facilitate 
monitoring of corrupt activities. 
h) Absence of whistle-blowing culture: Corruption thrives in a society that does not 
encourage the culture of reporting corrupt activities to the relevant authorities. 
i) Emphasis on certification: Parents’ and/or society’s emphasis on paper 
certification can make the students bent on getting paper certificates by any 
means possible. 
Forms of corruption 
Corruption can be divided into three broad forms: petty, grand and systemic. 
a) Petty corruption: This refers to those corrupt activities that take place in the 
‘streets’ or common places such as payment of bribes to a police officer to evade 
a traffic offence. 
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b) Grand corruption: This type of corruption takes place mostly within the political 
sector. For example, payment of bribes to presidents or top government officials 
to get certain favours. 
c) Systemic corruption: This refers to the corruption that has engulfed a domain of 
activity, such as education. There is widespread awareness of the need to engage 
in corrupt behaviour in order to elicit services. 
Within the education system, each of the categories—petty, grand or systemic 
corruption—corrupt practices can be further subdivided into four types: financial, 
administrative, academic and professional. 
a) Financial corruption: This type of corruption has to do with finances within the 
education system, for example, offering of fraud, extortion, bribes, ghost 
deliveries, allocation of specific grants and embezzlements of school funds. 
b) Administrative corruption: This is the corruption that takes place in the 
bureaucratic processes in the education system such as a delay in the payment 
of teachers’ salaries, partial distribution of educational materials, purchase of 
unnecessary equipment, bias in the appointment and deployment of 
teachers/educational stakeholders, discrimination or victimisation of teachers, 
unauthorised deductions, poor administration of examinations, illegal admission 
into school and illegal accreditation of schools. 
c) Academic corruption: This type of corruption happens when policies in education 
are contravened so that individuals would get undeserved favour. Examples are 
plagiarism, examination malpractice, teacher incompetence, bias in the selection 
of authors, bypass of copyright law, impersonation, certificate forgery, sale of 
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makeshift copies of textbook extracts and lecturers having more than one full-
time job. 
d) Professional corruption: This refers to the corrupt behaviour that goes against the 
codes of conduct in education such as teachers’ absenteeism, ghost workers, 
illegal fees, sexual harassment of students by teachers, selecting/suppressing 
information, irregularity in producing and publishing information and 
manipulation of data. 
Consequences of corruption 
Corruption has two broad consequences: positive and negative. 
I. Positive consequence: Payment of bribes can speed up certain business activities 
that would hitherto take longer time to process. 
II. Negative consequences: The negative consequences of corruption are either 
economic or social. From the economic perspective: 
a) Corruption is detrimental to entrepreneurship, taxation, local private 
investments, planning and foreign aids. 
b) Corruption reduces foreign direct investments (FDI). 
c) Corruption also reduces productivity over time. 
d) Corruption can cause huge delays in the economic growth of any country. 
From the social perspective: 
e) Corruption causes socio-economic imbalance. 
f) Corruption causes social harm. 
g) Corruption hinders effective service delivery. 
h) Corruption in education will lead to a generally weak education system. 
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i) It causes a decline of the efficacy of education institutions. 
j) Low quality of products is another consequence of corruption in education. 
• It can cause citizenry’s negative national perception 
• It affects the developmental efforts and survival of a nation 
Measures of deterring corruption can be either preventive or corrective. Within these 
two broad categories, there are three main measures of fighting corruption: 
a) Intervention and prosecution:  This refers to a situation where relevant 
agencies intervene, investigate, arrest and prosecute individuals guilty of a 
corrupt behaviour. 
b) Management: Individuals intending to engage in corrupt behaviour are 
discouraged through the establishment of appropriate systems, procedures 
and protocols. 
c) Organisational integrity: It has to do with an organisation’s operational 
systems, control strategies for corruption and ethical standards for a norm of 
ethical behaviour to be created. 
• Mobilisation: This refers to the enlistment and fostering of public 
support in combating corruption. 
• Research and documentation: This is aimed at deepening the 
understanding of the nature of corruption. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the design and the procedures adopted 
for the study, including the sources of data, the data collection strategies and 
instruments and the validity and reliability of these instruments. 
The type of research design adopted by this study is an exploratory design. According 
to the University of Southern California Libraries (2016), exploratory design is 
conducted about a research when the earlier studies to refer to or rely upon to predict 
an outcome are a few or none. This assertion aligns with the nature of this study as 
earlier stated, there are a few or no studies carried out in this area. Hence, through the 
study, insights and familiarity would be gained for necessary future investigations for 
related studies. 
Walliman (2011) noted that not all information can be reduced to numbers. Examples of 
such are people’s beliefs, judgements, feelings of comfort, emotions as well as ideas can 
only be described in words which cannot be manipulated mathematically. This means 
that qualities, not quantities, are measured. As a result, this research study can be seen 
as a qualitative research. 
There is a plethora of anti-corruption policies in Nigeria. However, there is always a 
clear distinction between the policy texts (policy intentions) and implementation 
(policy enactment) relating to the reports of the ICPC since these reports encapsulate 
all the activities of the Commission. The rationale behind the choice of the ICPC, among 
others, is that it is the first agency, during the fourth republic, which was tasked with 
the responsibility of eradicating corruption in Nigeria. It addresses corruption in all 
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sectors, with a special focus on the education sector. Since Nigeria got her independence 
from Great Britain on 1st October 1960, there have been four democratic dispensations, 
which can be termed ‘republics’. The first republic took place between 1963 and 1966; 
second republic, 1979 to 1983; third republic, 1993 and the fourth republic, 1999 to date 
(Findlay, 2017). 
The official annual reports of the ICPC from 2009 to 2013 have been analysed. These 
reports for these years were selected because they are the only recent reports that are 
publicly available. 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
Granted that this is a qualitative research, the form of the data used would be secondary 
data. According to Walliman (2011), secondary data are data that have been interpreted 
and recorded in the form of news bulletins, magazines, newspapers, documentaries, 
reports, advertising, refereed journals containing papers vetted by leading experts, 
serious journals, books as well as the Internet. He further noted that, to avoid bias, 
inaccuracies and pure imagination, it is advisable to compare the data from different 
sources. However, in this case study, since the activities of the ICPC are the being 
examined, only the reports from the ICPC can provide more valid information relating 
to the purposes of this study. 
Obtaining these reports from the ICPC was a rather difficult and strenuous exercise. 
Initially, the reports were not available online. I had to travel to the ICPC’s headquarters 
in Abuja, Nigeria from Cape Town, South Africa (in December 2015) to physically 
request the reports. Eventually, four months after my visit to Abuja, and following 
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constant calls, emails and notifications on their social media platforms, the reports were 
uploaded to the commission’s website, from where I downloaded them.  
This type of data sampling is purposeful. The reason for adopting purposeful data 
sampling is hinged on two implications. Palys (2008) outlines these implications as the 
researcher’s sample must be tied to their objectives and that the choice of sampling 
strategy will depend on the context in which the researchers are working and the nature 
of their research objectives. This sampling, as opined by Sharma (2017), helps the 
researcher to make generalisations from the sample that is being studied and provides 
a wide-range of non-probability sampling techniques for the researcher to draw on; 
while its disadvantages include its high tendency to researcher’s bias and difficulty in 
convincing the reader that research using purposeful sampling achieved 
theoretical/analytical/logical generalisations. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
In the view of Marshall and Rossman (1999), data analysis involves the bringing of order, 
structure and meaning to the mass of collected data. To this end, the texts of the reports 
(qualitative public documents) constituted the data set within its natural setting, which 
was analysed based on the framework outlined in the previous chapter. The data 
analysis focused on descriptions of the activities of the Commission that applied across 
sectors, as well as descriptions of the activities of the Commission related to education, 
specifically. Activities that pertained to the different themes of corruption (definition, 
correlates, forms, consequences and combative measures respectively) were 
categorised. These categories enable the reader to identify the aspects of corruption that 
the ICPC prioritised and where it did not. This method is what Pope, Ziebland and Mays 
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(2000) refer to as ‘framework analysis’. It reflects the original accounts and observations 
of the sample studied and starts from pre-set aims and objectives. 
Each report was retyped from the first page to the last page. Each segment (sentence 
and paragraph) was categorised according to the headings derived from the conceptual 
framework, i.e. definition, correlates, forms, consequences and combative measures of 
corruption respectively, using Microsoft Excel. 
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Thomson (2011) noted that the reporting of the data must have the same accuracy as 
well as its transcription. Also, if there is an omission of any data, the descriptive validity 
of that study may be questioned. To ensure a valid and reliable analysis, each of the 
reports was meticulously retyped, word for word from the beginning of the report to the 
last word. Each concept (or segment) was then categorised. This categorisation upholds 
the conceptual validity of this study i.e. the alignment of contents to concepts. 
According to Locke (2012), in maintaining conceptual validity, the researcher must 
ensure that the concept: is tied to reality, clearly distinguished from related concepts 
and properly delimited. This study recognised the views of Locke (2012) in categorising 
the concepts. As a result, generalisability was also not an issue, as conclusions pertain 
only to the data that has been analysed. The nature of the content of the reports is such 
that there is no real threat to interpretive validity or reliability: the content of the reports 
is intended to be clear to the layman and is relatively unambiguous. 
  
 
55 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the presentation, interpretation and analysis of data obtained 
from the reports of the ICPC for the years 2009 to 2013. The analysis focused on how the 
following aspects of corruption are represented in the reports: definition, correlates, 
forms, consequences and combative measures. Recall Kingdom and Maekae’s (2013) view 
on the roles of the role of education in Nigeria as highlighted in Chapter One of this 
study, hence it is important to ensure that these roles remain paramount and devoid of 
any form of corrupt behaviour. As a result, the ICPC was established to rid Nigeria of all 
forms of corruption in all sectors including education. Hence, it is important to analyse 
how the ICPC views the corruption in terms of its definition, correlates, forms, 
consequences and combative measures. Recall that this study is based on the assumption 
of this study that an anti-corruption agency cannot ameliorate corruption except the 
agency possesses a good understanding of the scope of corruption (as stated in Chapter 
One). 
For this analysis, using the definition of corruption as an example, the reports will be 
analysed with the aim of establishing whether corruption is defined by the Commission; 
and if the Commission defines it, how they define it.  
This analysis considered the reports with regard to corruption in general, and also more 
specifically with regard to corruption in the education sector. 
DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
There were no attempts to define corruption in any of the reports other than in 2012. 
The definition given in 2012 was not really a definition in the true sense of the word but 
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rather an exemplification of corruption. Corruption was exemplified “as including 
bribery, fraud and other related offences” (ICPC, 2012: 3). Furthermore, a list of offences 
considered to be corrupt activities was given in a table as “gratification, bribery, fraud, 
postal crimes, false statements, deliberate frustration of investigation and conspiracy” 
(ICPC, 2012: 3). The focus primarily related to financial matters and subsequent related 
activities arising from or covering up of the crimes. This implicitly excludes other forms 
of corruption such as academic, administrative and professional forms. 
The reports did not state any definition for corruption in education specifically. 
CORRELATES OF CORRUPTION 
Only the 2009 report refers to correlates of corruption, mentioning ‘lack of 
accountability’ and ‘silence of the law’ as ‘causes’. The 2009 report also refers to two 
papers, presented at events, which refer to the causes of and ‘prelude to’ corruption, 
specifically ‘living above means’. 
YEAR EVENT TITLE PAGE No. 
2009 2nd National Development Summit, 
Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja (1st April) 
Forms, Causes, Effects and 
Remedies to Corruption 
27 
2009 1st Sensitisation Seminar of the Federal 
Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development, Federal Secretariat, 
Abuja (16th - 17th June: Planning, 
Research and Review Department) 
Living Above Means: A Prelude to 
Corruption 
27 
Table 2: Correlates of corruption mentioned in the reports 
There is no mention in any of the reports of correlates of corruption such as poverty, 
poor salary structure, unemployment, lack of infrastructure, political instability, lack of 
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political will, lack of community involvement and others. There is also no mention of 
the correlates of corruption in education, specifically. 
FORMS OF CORRUPTION 
There are no references to specific forms of corruption in 2012 and 2013. All references 
relating to forms of corruption appear in the reports for 2009, 2010 and 2011 of which 
the latter two contain more mentions of specific forms of corruption: of the 33 
references to specific forms of corruption in all the reports, 30 were in 2010 and 2011 
reports. These are below: 
FORM SUB-DIVISION OFFENCE YEAR PAGE No. 
Systemic Administrative 1. Institutionalised 2009 5 
     
Grand Financial 1. Embezzlement (3) 2010; 2010; 2011 25; 26; 22 
  2. Fraud (12) 2010; 2010; 2010; 2010; 
2010; 2010; 2011; 2011; 
2011; 2011; 2011; 2011 
25; 25; 25; 25; 
25; 25; 21; 21; 
21; 22; 22; 22 
  3. Bribe (2) 2011; 2011 21; 22 
     
Petty Financial 1. Bribe  2010 8-9;  
  2. Fraud (8) 2009; 2009; 2010; 2010; 
2010; 2011; 2011; 2011 
10; 21; 21; 25; 
26; 21; 22; 22 
  3. False statement 2010 10; 
  4. Embezzlement 2010; 2010 10; 10; 
     
 Administrative 1. Deliberate frustration 
of investigation 
2010 21 
     
 Academic 1. Fraud (2) 2010; 2011 10-11; 25 
Table 3: Forms of corruption mentioned in the reports 
While the reports after 2011 do not mention specific forms of corruption, they do refer 
to papers presented at events such as seminars in which forms of corruption (such as 
petty and grand) are mentioned. 
In all cases, in the actual reports, the references to forms of corruption are brief. The 
bulk of the reports was dedicated to discussing combative measures against corruption.  
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While the Commission mentions corruption offences such as gratification, postal 
crimes, false statements and deliberate frustration of investigation and conspiracy, the 
specific references suggest that the real focus of attention was on financial corruption, 
with fraud, bribe and embezzlement being the most common. 
There were, in total, five cases of specific instance of corruption in education all 
mentioned in the 2010 and 2011 reports. These were all instances of petty academic 
corruption: a college provost that was charged for collecting N700,000.00 for renovation 
of the college farm which he did not do; a lecturer who received salary as a full-time 
worker from two institutions at the same time; a bursar of Lagos State University who 
was arrested for a reason that was not stated; an alleged exam leakage at a law school 
and exam malpractice officials.  
With respect to education-specific cases of corruption mentioned above, one can 
conclude that the Commission’s main focus is on petty financial form of corruption. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION 
Analysis of the reports shows that the Commission paid little attention to the 
consequences of corruption. Consequences of corruption are mentioned only three 
times, twice in the 2009 report and once in the 2010 report. All these three mentions are 
made in the context of the ‘Chairman’s message’. The consequences referred to relate 
to the status of Nigeria as “public perception of Nigeria as a corruption-ridden country 
persists”, the need to restore Nigeria to “its enviable status of respectability, dignity and 
honour within the comity of nations” and “the danger it poses against the development 
and survival of any nation”. 
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While there is limited mention of the consequences of corruption in the actual reports, 
it is clear that this topic was discussed at government events as the reports refer to five 
papers presented at events, workshops or seminars regarding the consequences of 
corruption. These papers may have necessitated analyses during their presentations, 
however these analyses did not reflect in the reports. 
YEAR EVENT TITLE PAGE 
No. 
2010 A 3-day annual International Retreat 
organised by the Rivers State House 
of Assembly in Rivers State (23rd 
February)  
Impact of Corruption on Non-
Performance of Budget 
27 
2010 One-day workshop for local officials 
in Plateau State organised by Benue 
State Office and sponsored by 
Ministry of Local Government and 
Chieftaincy Affairs, Plateau State 
(16th December) 
Corruption in Local Government 
Administration in Nigeria: Emergent 
Socio-Economic and Related Issues 
31 
2011 A two-day meeting Corruption: Causes, Consequences 
and Typology 
17 
2011 Anti-Corruption Club’s Day at 
Government Secondary School, Kuje 
(13th July) 
Effects of Corruption on Students’ 
Learning Process towards Building a 
New Nigeria 
27 
2011 34th Biennial Convention of 
International Federation of Female 
Lawyers (FIDA) (24th November) 
Consequences and Effects of 
Corruption on the Progress and 
Economic Empowerment of Women 
28 
Table 4: Consequences of corruption mentioned in the reports 
There was also a reference to a paper presented at a school where the effects of 
corruption on students’ learning was discussed. Since the Commission held events to 
discuss the consequences of corruption (as seen in the titles of the papers discussed), 
but made little reference to this in the reports, it would seem that the Commission saw 
the reports as vehicles for combating corruption and not as a vehicle for discussing 
related issues of corruption (such as its consequences).  
COMBATIVE MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION 
There are two categories of combative measures: proactive or preventive and reactive 
or prosecutorial measures (as mentioned in the second chapter of this study). The 
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proactive measures connote those measures put in place to discourage or reduce the 
chances of a corrupt activity to take place. These measures include organisational 
integrity (organisation’s operation system, control strategies and ethical standards) and 
management (education, sensitisation and enlightenment). The reports present 
education as the major vehicle for the transferral of knowledge sensitisation and 
enlightenment. 
The other category of combative measures can be called reactive measures (also in the 
second chapter of this study). Like the proactive measures, these measures also act as a 
deterrent to subsequent corrupt acts taking place but they refer to measures put in place 
to combat corruption after it has taken place. Reactive measures include petitioning and 
prosecuting the offenders. 
In the table below, all references to combative measures have been categorised. General 
combative measures, that is, all the activities put in place to combat corruption outside 
the spectrum of education, are presented in the first section while all the activities 
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Theme 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
PROACTIVE MEASURES (general) 
Organisational 
Integrity 






























6 system studies 
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A draft system 







study and review 
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plan and other 
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federal colleges of 
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universities 
Participated in the 
sighting of and 
marking exercise 
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Met with the 
national executive 
of the Nigerian 
Union of Teachers 
(NUT) to get their 
buy-in into a 
proposal by the 
Commission to 
make input into 
the Teachers Code 
of Conduct and to 
train teachers on 
the ICPC Act and 








at all levels of 
education in the 
country 
 
Infusion of the 
National Values 
Curriculum 
(NVC) into Basic 
1-9 (Primaries 1-6 
and Junior 
Secondary 1-3) as 















status of the NVC 
in secondary 
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and review 
exercise into 3 
universities 
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Teacher Guide on 








REACTIVE MEASURES (general) 










Investigation No given number 
of investigated 
cases 
No given number 
of investigated 
cases 
107 out of 458 
cases were fully 
investigated 
3 out of 140 cases 
were merged with 
other petitions; 
 




3 were returned to 
the Office of the 
Chairman 
 
25 recoveries were 
made as a result 
 
Investigators 
testified in 22 
courts 
243 cases were fully 
investigated 
Arrests 3 arrests 7 arrests None 16 arrests None 
Prosecution 7 prosecutions 
recorded 
 




















21 cases were filed 
 


















57 cases were filed 
 
191 cases still 
pending 
EDUCATION (specific) 




(the amount was 
not specified on 
the graph) 
None 
Investigation None 2 cases 1 case 2 cases None 
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Arrests None None 2 arrests None 1 arrest 
Prosecution None 2 cases None 2 recoveries of 
funds 











for data on 
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Table 5: Combative measures of corruption mentioned in the reports 
The table above is a detailed one. It clearly shows where the emphasis of the 
Commission lies in terms of its fight against corruption in Nigeria. Within the reactive 
measures category, the Commission received a total of 4,898 petitions but only 350 of 
them were fully investigated. Overall, 26 arrests were made. There were no arrests in 
2011 and 2013 even though a total of 350 out of 2,065 cases were fully investigated in both 
years combined. Twenty-five prosecutions were secured, while 649 cases were pending 
or being prosecuted (it is not stated if the pending cases were carried over from the 
previous years or if they were new cases). Thirty-two recoveries were made only in 2012. 
It can be said that even though the Commission received many petitions, only a few 
convictions were secured. This shows a very low rate of prosecutions. In fact, there were 
no records of secured convictions in 2013. The implication for this is that the actual 
reactive measures were ultimately not very effective. 
The education-specific table shows more direct participation of the Commission in 
combating corruption within the education sector under the reactive measures 
category. More education specific measures occurred in 2012 than in any other years 
under review. In 2012, almost 40 petitions were received from higher institutions of 
learning. There were no petitions recorded in other years. A total of five cases were 
investigated in 2010, 2011 and 2012 and none for 2009 and 2013. Only two arrests were 
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prosecutions in 2010 and 2012. Thus, in the education sector, as in other sectors more 
generally, reactive measures did not seem to be very effective in leading to arrests and 
prosecutions. 
There were numerous activities carried out by the Commission to ensure that the 
integrity of organisations was either maintained or enhanced in the five years under 
review. These activities include carrying out 83 system reviews and establishing the 
Anti-Corruption and Transparency Monitoring Units (ACTUs). A draft standardised 
system as well as an ICT strategy for the Commission was developed for the education 
system. 1,082 ACTUs were established in the first three years (2009, 2010 and 2011). Many 
partnerships with civil societies and other relevant organisations were established in the 
earlier years (i.e. excluding 2013). 
Overall, the reports place the greatest emphasis on combating corruption by educating 
the public about and against corruption and prosecuting offenders. There is also a 
strong emphasis on establishing partnerships with other organisations and forming 
anti-corruption clubs with the goal of educating the public against corrupt activities. 
Education was relevant to the activities of the Commission in two distinct ways. Firstly, 
there were activities aimed at dealing with corruption within the education system. For 
example, the Commission took a comprehensive look into corruption in general 
education and further carried out a pilot study and review exercise in three universities. 
Secondly, education was positioned as a vehicle for combating corruption across all 
sectors of society. A National Values Curriculum (NVC) was developed and infused into 
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selected subjects in 2009 and 2010. A teacher’s guide on the NVC was developed in 2010. 
Also, the publications of the Commission kept the public abreast of all of its activities. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has suggested that there is a sketchy conceptualisation of corruption in the 
reports. The view of corruption is largely limited to issues pertaining to grand and petty 
corruption such as bribery, fraud and related offences (e.g. prevention of escape from 
prosecution for these offences).  
The reports would suggest that the measures adopted to combat corruption were not 
very effective. While there was a high number of petitions received by the Commission, 
the number of investigations carried out was much lower, and the number of 
prosecutions even lower. Further discussions of these insights will take place in the next 
chapter. 
The reports themselves did not show any consideration of the correlates or 
consequences of corruption.  
There is a chronological change of emphasis across the reports. This can be linked to a 
change of leadership in the latter part of 2011 when a new Chairperson was appointed in 
an acting capacity, and in 2012 when the position was made permanent. Even though 
the general focus on combative measures was sustained, there was a shift towards a 
greater focus on sensitisation and enlightenment activities in 2012 than in any other 
year. The emphasis on the integrity of the system was also increased in 2012. There were 
also more education related activities in 2012. However, in 2013, there seemed to have 
been a slowdown of anti-corruption activities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has examined the activities of the ICPC, a major agency that has been 
mandated to fight corruption in Nigeria, both on a general scale and within the 
education system specifically. Recall that this study holds the assumption that 
ameliorating corruption is effective when corruption is understood. The purposes of the 
study have been to consider how the ICPC conceptualises corruption, its correlates, 
forms, consequences and proposed combative measures, and to compare this to the way 
this has been conceptualised in scholarly literature.  
This chapter highlights the general insights that were raised in the previous chapter and 
then discusses these insights in relation to the scholarly literature. The key insights that 
have emerged from analysis have been, that:  
• the conceptualisation of corruption is very limited, as is the range of forms 
addressed; 
• there is little or no consideration of the correlates/causes of corruption; 
• there is little or no consideration of the consequences of corruption; 
• the proposed combative measures are narrowly focused; and 
• educating a nation is seen primarily as a vehicle to fight corruption in all spheres. 
Each of these insights is discussed more fully below: 
Conceptualisation 
The Commission did not explicitly give a working definition of corruption in any of the 
reports. However, in the 2012 report (ICPC, 2012: 3), corruption was defined as 
“including bribery, fraud and other related offences". Also mentioned were 
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"gratification, bribery, fraud, postal crimes, false statements, deliberate frustration of 
investigation and conspiracy" (ICPC, 2012: 3). 
These activities have to do mainly with finances and other subsequent activities that 
may arise from covering up finance related crimes. An implication of this view (that 
corruption mainly involves finance) is that there is a neglect of corrupt offences that are 
non-financial in nature such as academic, administrative and professional forms of 
corruption, as is discussed further below. 
According to Portal (2015), there is yet to be consensus on a globally accepted definition 
for corruption. This may be one of the reasons why the ICPC did not present a clear-cut 
definition of corruption. However, most of the scholarly literature discussed in chapter 
two sees corruption as primarily relating to the abuse of entrusted power or resources 
for personal gain or advantage (World Bank, 1997; Klitgaard, 1998; Myint, 2000; Pope, 
2000 and Salisu, 2000).  
This is not inconsistent with the way corruption is understood in the report. However, 
personal gain need not necessarily be financial, especially in the sphere of education 
where it could include numerous other advantages, such as obtaining qualifications by 
illicit means. 
Wei (2017) has suggested that having a clear-cut definition of corruption will make the 
fight against corruption easier and has argued that corruption was reduced in the 
United States when some forms of corruption were legally defined. On this basis, the 
study suggests that the work of the ICPC would be strengthened by a clearer and 
broader conceptualisation of corruption. 
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The forms of corruption 
The analysis categorised corruption into three main types: petty, grand and systemic. 
Within these categories are four sub-categories: financial, administrative, academic and 
professional.  
From the data available in the reports, petty-financial corruption (specifically bribery, 
fraud and embezzlement) seems to be the main focus of the Commission. There was 
also some consideration of systemic corruption where the Commission conducted 
system studies in different parastatals. However, what was conspicuously missing was 
attention to grand or political corruption. There were no cases reported of corruption 
involving prominent personalities that were prosecuted. In the opinion of Persson et al. 
(2013), the prosecution of corrupt prominent individuals will serve as a deterrent to 
others and help instil integrity and consciousness in citizens. 
Another implication of the above is that the focus on petty-finance related cases of 
corruption means the neglect of other forms of corruption such as administrative, 
academic and professional corruption. This is particularly relevant in the sphere of 
education where these particular forms of corruption are pertinent. Neglect of certain 
forms of corruption can indirectly cause such forms to thrive. 
Little or no consideration of the correlates of corruption 
The correlates of corruption were hardly discussed in the reports. Of all the papers 
presented at the ICPC-organised seminars, only two papers (in 2009) had titles relating 
to correlates of corruption.  
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The literature informs that, even though the presence of the correlates of corruption 
does not necessarily mean that corruption is present (Shehu, 2005), it is important to 
see these correlates as possible indicators of corruption.  
Shehu (2005) remarks that symptoms of corruption include crime, unemployment, 
poverty and underdevelopment. This study suggests that if these symptoms are taken 
care of or even understood with the aim of providing solutions to them, a decline in 
corruption may be experienced. For example, since unemployment and poverty are seen 
as correlates of corruption, the ICPC could put measures in place to reduce these by 
liaising with corporate bodies and relevant stakeholders to increase employment 
opportunities. This is in line with Aluko’s (2002) comment that, when the economic gap 
between the rich and poor continues to increase, the tendency for the poor to sell their 
conscience to the rich increases. Thus, the poor (who may not necessarily have a steady 
source of income) may become vulnerable to all forms of social vices, including 
corruption.  
This study suggests that it is feasible for the Commission to address at least certain 
correlates of corruption such as advocating the support for better salary structures for 
workers. Recall that Lambsdorff (2006) and Azfar and Nelson (2007) affirmed that 
increasing government wages reduces corruption levels but does not necessarily 
eliminate it. Similarly, the Commission can partner with relevant stakeholders to 
increase opportunities for job creation. Getting more people to be gainfully employed 
can be a good step towards curbing corruption. 
The combative measures proposed in the reports are discussed below. However, the 
relation between correlates of corruption and combative measures is noted here, i.e. 
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that a consideration of correlates can suggest combative measures. For example, in 
education specifically, Anzene (2014) has suggested that a correlate of corruption is the 
emphasis on paper certification instead of knowledge, skills and competence, leading 
to an increase in the occurrence of examination malpractice. One way to address this is 
by strengthening the professional associations that monitor assessment in particular 
fields of study, especially for professions, including education, as well as accounting, 
engineering, medicine and so forth.  
Some correlates of corruption are perhaps easier to address than others, and these could 
be regarded as low hanging fruit. For example, if dependence on donor funding is 
regarded as one of the correlates of corruption, donor activity could be regulated to 
limit inappropriate donor influence. And if weak monitoring of administrative systems 
is seen to be a correlate of corruption, and the argument that e-governments reduce the 
kind of corruption that occurs in face-to-face interactions is accepted, e-governments 
could be extended in vulnerable domains of activity. Finally, if corruption is more 
common where direct stakeholders do not participate in the monitoring management 
of public investments, such as schools, structures that facilitate such participation can 
be put in place. 
The limited consideration given to the correlates of corruption by the ICPC in its reports 
does not help in the fight against corruption. As averred by the Centre of Democracy 
and Governance (1999) and Othman, Shafie and Hamid (2014), one of the ways of 
fighting corruption and the challenges that it brings is, by first understanding, its 
correlates.  
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Little or no consideration of the consequences of corruption 
As was the case with the correlates of corruption, the Commission did not pay much 
consideration to the consequences of corruption. There were three mentions relating to 
the consequences of corruption in 2009 and 2010 (in the Chairman’s message). There 
were five events which were related to the consequences of corruption between 2010 
and 2011. 
While the reports were not primarily designed to discuss the consequences of 
corruption, the fight against corruption would be more effective if there were a wider 
understanding of the impact of corruption on social and economic opportunities. The 
World Bank (1997) suggested that understanding the consequences of corruption on an 
economic or political system can help in identifying specific types of activities as being 
corrupt. The reports could potentially contribute to such an understanding by paying 
attention to the consequences of corruption.  
The nature of combative measures 
In the reports, there were two main categories of combative measures adopted by the 
ICPC: proactive and reactive. Essentially, proactive measures are those that relate to 
prevention of corruption while reactive measures address corruption acts once they 
have already occurred (Kaufmann, 1997). The Commission’s preventive and public 
enlightenment and education mandates comprise its proactive measures while its 
enforcement mandate reflects the reactive measures. 
The analysis showed huge dependence on proactive measures by the Commission to 
combat corruption. All the reports mentioned numerous strategies for enlightening the 
public about corruption. These include organising lectures, workshops and drama 
groups, forming and recruiting volunteers, anti-corruption groups, establishing 
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partnerships with relevant bodies such as NGOs, developing templates for infusing anti-
corruption messages into curricula and using mass and social media platforms. These 
strategies are admirable. However, there is no way of assessing how effective they have 
been. McCusker (2006) has argued that such strategies focus efforts on educating those 
who may never consider corrupt acts. These measures are more effective against those 
who are corrupt in relatively unplanned ways and less effective against those who are 
corrupt in more planned, systematic and ultimately more damaging ways. Hence, 
depending mainly on this approach can be risky as it may not yield maximum results. 
There is even greater cause for concern when one considers the reactive measures of the 
Commission, as the reports themselves provide evidence that these proved to be largely 
ineffective. For example, of the 4,898 petitions received by the Commission in five years, 
only 350 were fully investigated. Of these, only 25 led to prosecutions and 649 cases 
were left ‘pending’. 
Persson et al. (2013) suggested that, to ensure that corrupt individuals are prosecuted 
and punished, the rule of law must be strengthened and backed up with political will. 
As an example of the required follow through, Waziri (2011) suggested that special 
courts can be established to speed up prosecutorial activities (see also Opara 2007). 
However, these measures require political will. The figures offered in the report suggest 
that this capacity and will were not evident. Perhaps, this explains why the Commission 
invested more time and energy in proactive, preventive measures instead. 
The Commission’s intensity to fight corruption seemed to slow down in 2013. The 
change of leadership in 2012 coincided with a flurry of anti-corruption activities but in 
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2013, there was a drastic reduction of such. This is arguably a consequence of a decline 
in political will at this time. 
Tackling corruption in the education system 
The analysis shows that the Commission focused on the education sector in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, the ICPC addressed corruption within the education system. To this end, 
it embarked on several anti-corruption activities such as the sensitisation of events, the 
inauguration of anti-corruption vanguards and conducting system reviews in schools. 
Most of these events were held in schools within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of 
the country. This study suggests that the Commission should expand its scope of anti-
corruption activities beyond the FCT. The schools in the 36 states of the country should 
be considered as well. 
As part of addressing corruption within the education sector, the Commission carried 
out pilot studies and review exercises in three universities in 2012. With over 150 
universities (federal, state and private) in the country, this number of system studies is 
low. The Commission would do well to extend its activities to federal, state and private 
universities in each of the country’s six geo-political zones as well as to colleges of 
education and polytechnics. 
Secondly, the Commission chose to use education as a vehicle for combating corruption 
across all sectors of society. In 2009, the Commission started the infusion of anti-
corruption curriculum called the National Values Curriculum (NVC) into selected 
subjects at all levels of education in the country. This was also followed by the 
development of a teachers’ guide on the NVC. 
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Concluding comment 
In general, the comparison drawn between the approach to fighting corruption 
emerging from scholarly literature and the evidence in the reports highlights numerous 
inadequacies in the approach of the ICPC. The main conclusion reached here is that the 
approach of the ICPC could potentially be strengthened considerably if it were to be 
informed by engagement with scholarship relating to corruption. However, this 
engagement is itself subject to political will. Where this is not strong, it is unlikely that 
other strategies would be effective. 
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